講座：Level-k Analysis of a Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information and Uncertainty: An experimental study
題 目：Level-k Analysis of a Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information and Uncertainty: An experimental study
嘉 賓：徐智博 博士后 深圳大學微眾金融科技學院
主持人：胥莉 副教授 上海交通大學安泰經濟與管理學院
地 點：上海交通大學 徐匯校區安泰樓A507室
This paper presents an experiment designed to study how people play a two-person two-stage dynamic game with incomplete information and uncertainty, a strictly competitive game related to real-world Casino games (Blackjack and Texas hold’em Poker), and to study the effect of different experimental description methods on strategic behaviours. To identify players’ strategic sophistication, a Bayes level-k analysis is introduced. The experimental data shows that around half of the subjects are strategic players and the Bayes level-k thinking dominates in strategic behaviours. Furthermore, the comparison between the direct-response description and the strategy-method description implies that subjects in the strategy-method description play less strategic behaviours.
Xu, Zhibo is the Post-Doc research fellow in the ShenZhen University WeBank Institute of FinTech. She received his Ph.D. in 2019 from the university of St Andrews and worked as Post-Doc research fellow at Marketing Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2019-2020). Her research interests are in experimental economics, behavioral economics, and decision making in dynamic games.